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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wayne Albert Webb appeals from the judgment and conviction entered on 
his plea of guilty to misdemeanor battery. Webb argues the district court abused 
its discretion in imposing two years of probation with the requirement that he 
attend 52 weeks of domestic violence counseling, and requiring Webb to pay 
$1,529.46 in restitution to the victim. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state initially charged Webb with one count of felony kidnapping or 
false imprisonment, one count of felony aggravated assault, and one count of 
felony domestic battery - traumatic injury. (R., pp. 10-12.) The victim was 
Webb's then-girlfriend, Launie Johnston. (R., pp. 11-12, 54-55.) The case 
proceeded to trial, and the jury found Webb not guilty of both kidnapping / false 
imprisonment and aggravated assault, but was unable to reach a verdict on the 
domestic battery charge. (R., pp. 172-73.) On that charge, the court set a new 
date for trial. (R., pp. 174, 176.) 
Before trial, Webb entered an Alford1 plea of guilty, per negotiations with 
the state, to the reduced charge of misdemeanor battery. (R., p. 177.) The state 
further agreed to recommend a sentence of 180 days with credit for two days 
served and the balance to be suspended, a $500 fine, and two years' probation. 
(R., pp. 177-78.) After taking Webb's plea, the district court ordered Webb to 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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undergo domestic violence and substance abuse evaluations at county expense. 
(R., pp. 178, 182.) 
Before sentencing, the state filed a Restitution Request for the victim, 
Launie Johnston, totaling $1,529.46, for lost wages, mileage, and other 
expenses incurred to attend court proceedings. (R., pp. 183-88.) Webb filed no 
objection. 
At sentencing, Webb's counsel stated, "we would ask that this court follow 
the recommendation of probation and place him on the two years of probation." 
(Tr., p. 7, Ls. 10-12.) The district court imposed the sentence Webb requested, 
and ordered $2,029.46 in restitution, "1,529.46 for Ms. Johnson and $500 to 
Jerome County for the domestic violence evaluation." (Tr., p. 9, L. 16-25; R., pp. 
192-94.) In addition, among other terms, the court ordered "the defendant shall 
complete a 52-week domestic violence program and follow all other 
recommendations as contained within the domestic violence evaluation." (Tr., p. 
10, Ls. 8-11.) Webb timely appealed his judgment and order of restitution. (R., 
pp. 206-08.) 
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ISSUES 
Webb states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
two (2) years of probation that required Mr. Webb to 
complete a 52 week domestic violence class. 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it required 
Mr. Webb to pay restitution to Launie Webb [sic] in the 
amount of $1,529.46. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Applying the correct standard of review, and in light of the record, has 
Webb failed to demonstrate a legal basis for this Court to disturb the 
requirement that he attend domestic violence counseling? 
2. Has Webb failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding restitution to the victim? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Applying The Correct Standard Of Review, And In Light Of The Record, Webb 
Has Failed To Demonstrate A Legal Basis For This Court To Disturb The 
Requirement That He Attend Domestic Violence Counseling 
A. Introduction 
argues the district court abused its discretion by requiring that he 
complete 52 weeKs domestic violence counseling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-4.) 
According to Webb, the 52 vveeKs counseling, recommended in Webb's 
domestic violence assessment, is an excessive sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
3-4.) Webb's argument fails because the requirement to attend domestic 
violence counseling is not a sentence, but a term of probation to which he did not 
object, and in fact agreed at sentencing. Further, Webb cannot show a legal 
basis to disturb the requirement, on review of the facts and under applicable law. 
B. Webb Did Not Object And Thus Failed To Preserve A Challenge To The 
Terms Of His Probation 
As an initial matter, "[a] challenge to the validity of a probation term that 
was not raised before the district court will not be considered on appeal." State 
v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 530, 20 P.3d 709, 714 (Ct. App. 2001). At Webb's 
sentencing, the district court ordered two years of probation, and required -
among other terms - that "[t]he defendant shall complete a 52-week domestic 
violence program and follow all other recommendations as contained within the 
domestic violence evaluation." (Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 10, L. 16.) The court then 
asked, "Sir, are you able to comply with those terms?" and Webb responded, 
"Yes, sir." (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 21-23.) Because Webb did not object to the domestic 
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violence counseling, this Court need not consider the issue. But even if the 
Court were to consider the argument, Webb cannot show the district court erred 
in requiring domestic violence counseling as a term of Webb's probation. 
C. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court "exercises free review over the application and 
construction of statutes." State v. Dicksen, 153 Idaho 70, 73, 266 P.3d 1175, 
1178 (Ct. App. 2011 ). This includes review over the trial court's application of 
I.C. § 19-2601, regarding the power to order probation. State v. Wardle, 137 
Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 2002). 
D. Webb Has Not Shown That Domestic Violence Counseling Is An 
Unreasonable Term Of Probation 
A trial court is authorized to impose terms and conditions of probation "as 
it deems necessary and expedient," under I.C. § 19-2601 (2). See Wardle, 137 
Idaho at 810, 53 P.3d at 1229. Although a trial court's discretion to impose 
terms of probation is broad, such terms "must be reasonably related to the 
rehabilitative and public safety goals of probation." ~ (citing State v. Gawron, 
112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)) (other citations omitted). 
"Whether the terms and conditions of a defendant's probation are reasonably 
related to the goals of probation is a legal question over which [the appellate 
courts] exercise free review." ~ (citing State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318, 847 
P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
Importantly, Webb has cited no legal authority to support his assertion 
that domestic violence counseling was an unreasonable term of probation. 
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(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) "When issues on appeal are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered." State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (citing I.AR. 35) (other 
citation omitted). Under Zichko, Webb's challenge to the district court's order 
requiring him to attend domestic violence counseling should be rejected. 
In addition to providing no legal support for his argument, Webb also fails 
to demonstrate a factual basis. The court ordered the 52 sessions of domestic 
violence counseling upon recommendation by Eric Jones, PhD., who conducted 
Webb's court-ordered domestic violence assessment. (Tr., p. 3, Ls. 22-24; 
Jones Assessment.) In the assessment's concluding section, Jones cited 
Webb's "history of repeated allegations of domestic battery, with a couple 
convictions," noting, "[t]he fact the history is fairly recent is cause for great 
concern particularly since [Webb] doesn't acknowledge these incidents." (Jones 
Assessment, p. 10.) This is supported throughout the assessment in Webb's 
responses, which demonstrate Webb's denial or minimization of responsibility for 
incidents of domestic violence. (Jones Assessment, pp. 2-3, 5-7.) About this, 
Jones observed, "[Webb] appears disconnected from the reality of his abuse 
behavior and needs help to correct this or his reactive conduct may lead to lethal 
outcomes in future relationships." (Jones Assessment, p. 10.) Jones 
commented, "Webb has never received domestic violence treatment despite his 
history of charges and convictions," and therefore recommended that Webb 
"complete a 52 session domestic violence program." (Jones Assessment, p. 10.) 
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The domestic violence counseling ordered by the court squarely 
addresses rehabilitation and protection of society, and is thus a reasonable and 
appropriate term of probation. Wardle, 137 Idaho at 810, 53 P.3d at 1229. This 
Court should therefore reject Webb's argument. 
11. 
Webb Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Its 
Order Of Restitution To The Victim 
A. Introduction 
Webb asserts the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution 
to Launie Johnston totaling $1,529.46. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5.) According to 
Webb, "the record is devoid of any information related to why restitution was 
ordered." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Webb further argues that Johnston's 
expenses were for travel to and from a trial which did not result in a conviction, 
and were therefore improper as restitution. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Because the 
record substantially supports that Johnston's travel expenses and lost wages 
were proximately caused by the crime for which Webb pleaded guilty, the court's 
order of restitution was appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The district court has discretion at sentencing "to determine whether 
restitution is appropriate and, if so, to set the amount." State v. Houser, 155 
Idaho 521, _, 314 P.3d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). The court 
determines the amount of economic loss suffered by and to be awarded to the 
crime victim "upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the trial court by 
the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator." State v. 
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Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C. § 
19-5304(6)). Factual findings by the sentencing court as to restitution "will not be 
disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Straub, 153 
Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013) (citing State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 
599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011)). "Substantial evidence is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." kl 
(citation omitted). The Court on appeal "will not overturn an order of restitution 
unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822, 242 P.3d 
at 192 (citation omitted). 
C. The Record Supports That Johnston's Economic Losses Were 
Proximately Caused By The Crime For Which Webb Pleaded Guilty 
Webb first argues the record lacks information about why restitution was 
ordered. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Contrary to Webb's argument, the prosecution 
submitted a restitution request and supporting documentation, asking for 
$1,529.46 for the victim Johnston, for lost wages, mileage, meals while traveling, 
and lodging, incurred to attend the pretrial and trial. (R., pp. 183-88.) Per I.C. § 
19-5304(6), this "evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor" outlines the 
basis for the restitution ordered. Although the court did not specifically mention 
its consideration of the prosecution's request and documentation, the restitution 
amount ordered precisely matches the amount in the request. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to infer that the court determined the restitution amount based on this 
substantial evidence in the record. See Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 
276. 
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Webb also points out that he was not convicted of any charges in the trial 
that Johnston attended. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Webb thus suggests that there 
is no causal link between Johnston's losses and his criminal conduct. Restitution 
may be ordered for a victim's economic loss or injury "only if there is a causal 
connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the 
loss suffered by the victim." State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495, 283 P.3d 
808, 812 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401). 
Causation includes actual and proximate cause. kl 
"[P]roximate cause deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the loss would flow from the criminal conduct." kl "The proximate cause inquiry 
requires a court to determine" if the losses at issue were "so highly unusual 'that 
a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his 
conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected"' them to be 
incurred. Id. A defendant is liable for restitution "if either the possible 
consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant 
should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his 
act." Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 207. 
A trial court will not typically award restitution for losses "actually and 
proximately caused only by ... offenses for which the charges were dismissed." 
kl However, Webb's trial addressed three counts, only two of which resulted in 
acquittals. (R., pp. 172-73.) On the third count, the jury did not reach a verdict. 
(R., p. 122-23.) It was as to this third count - the domestic battery charge - that 
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Webb entered a plea agreement, reducing the charge to misdemeanor battery in 
exchange for his guilty plea. (R., pp. 177-78.) 
It cannot reasonably be said that Johnston attended the pretrial and trial 
only as to the two counts for which Webb was acquitted. As the victim of all the 
charged conduct, Johnston attended proceedings as to all three counts against 
Webb, including the battery charge to which he ultimately pied guilty. Criminal 
proceedings - including the pretrial and trial - and the victim's attendance of 
those proceedings, are foreseeable results of a defendant's criminal conduct. 
See Houser, 155 Idaho at _, 314 P .3d at 210. The record supports that 
Johnston's expenses incurred due to her attendance at criminal proceedings in 
this matter were reasonably foreseeable, and thus causally connected to Webb's 
criminal conduct. Webb has failed to show the court abused its discretion in 
awarding restitution as requested by the prosecution. Accordingly, Webb's 
challenge to the order of restitution should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order and judgment of conviction and restitution. 
DATED this 20th day of February, 2014. 
DAPHN1EJ.HijANG 
Deputy Attorney General 
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